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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
Volume XXVI APRIL, 1941 Number,3
THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940
ALFRED JARETZKI, JR.t
INTRODUCTION
An understanding of the Investment Company Act1 of 1940
calls for a recognition of three important factors contributing to
its composition: (1) the history of the investment company in-
dustry in this country with the general nature of the abuses to
which it had been subject; (2) the pattern of recent federal
legislation and particularly regulatory legislation whose enforce-
ment has been entrusted to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission; and (3) the fact that federal legislation regulating in-
vestment companies would not have been passed by Congress
in 1940 except for the active collaboration of the investment
companies. In other words, the Act must be read in the light
of the nature of the industry and the problems sought to be
corrected, of the Administration's approach to such problems as
evidenced by other legislation and of the fact that the Act con-
stituted in a sense compromise legislation. It should be noted,
however, that the Act was not an arbitrary or irrational com-
promise of irreconcilable differences, but was the result of an
agreement reached by give and take on both sides, accomplishing
on the one hand at least the main objectives of the original legis-
t A.B., Harvard University, 1913; LL.B., 1916. Member of the New York
Bar.
The writer represented a group of closed-end investment companies at
the Senate and House hearings on the investment company bill and par-
ticipated actively in the negotiations leading to the agreement with respect
to such legislation and in the drafting of the Act in its final form. Ac-
cordingly, although it is his intention that this article be as objective as
possible, the writer recognizes that he is not a disinterested commentator.
1. (1940) 54 Stat.-; c. 686, tit. 1, 15 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940) sec.
80a, 11 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940) secs. 72(a), 107(f).
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lation, gnd on the other hand meeting the chief objections to the
bill as first introduced. This was made possible, not merely be-
cause of the real desire of both sides to cooperate, but more
particularly because of the sympathetic understanding on each
side of the opposing point of view. Both parties, the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the industry, were apparently
well satisfied with the result; and Congress seemed pleased to
have presented to it without controversy so comprehensive a
piece of legislation.
For a brief statement of the problems which the investment
company legislation was designed, in part at least, to solve, refer-
ence is made to the Senate and House Committee Reports. 2 More
detailed data will be found in the voluminous reports made by
the Securities and Exchange Commission as the result of its
outstandingly able and painstaking investigation of investment
companies. These reports contain a mass of valuable material.
They must nevertheless in some measure be regarded as in the
nature of ex pctrte documents which have not been subjected to
the test of controversy. Many statements appearing in these re-
ports were disputed by representatives of the industry at the
Senate Hearings3 and much of the material is subject to misin-
terpretation by the uninitiated. In general, it might perhaps be
fair to compare the flavor of these reports to the flavor of the
bill as originally introduced and the tone of the Senate and House
Reports to the tone of the bill as finally enacted.4
Investment companies are often spoken of as the pooling of
funds for the purchase of securities. While this is true, the
unthinking use of these words has led many into the error of
believing that significance attaches to the fact of the pooling of
funds. This is not the case. Any corporation or joint enterprise
is such. The difference between an investment company and
other companies lies in the use to which these funds are put.
2. Sen. Rep. No. 1775 (1940) 76th Cong., 3rd Sess.; H. R. Rep. No.
2639 (1940) 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. Excellent summaries of the Act will be
found in the reports, the Senate Report dealing with the subject function-
ally, and the House Report, section by section.
3. Much of the Government's testimony passed unchallenged because of
the time factor and because in many cases those particularly concerned
were not present or represented.
4. This is natural as the original bill was based on the Securities and
Exchange Commission Reports, and the Senate and House Reports repre-
sented the point of view of the bill in its final form.
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The significance of the distinction lies in the fact that the stock-
holder of a steel company does not have the choice of himself
buying and working an anvil and forge or pooling his resources
with others in the purchase and operation of a steel mill, while
the investment company stockholder has the choice of himself
purchasing securities directly or joining with others in the pur-
chase of securities. By joining with others he may be able to
diversify his risk to a greater extent than he could by himself,
he may be able to afford more expert management, or he may
be able to join in the purchase of control of one or more other
corporations. But he is likely to be thinking of his stock always
in terms of its pro rata share of the underlying securities and
the income derived from them.5
In general, the types of investment companies which will be
discussed in this article may be divided into open-end and closed-
end companies and the latter into leverage and non-leverage com-
panies.6 The provisions of the Act relating to unit trusts, face
amount certificate companies, et cetera will not be discussed.7
Open-end companies are companies in which the stockholder has
the right at any time to present his certificate of stock for re-
demption and to receive in exchange its approximate per share
liquidating value, that is to say, the approximate value of its
proportionate share of the assets. As there is normally a con-
stant liquidation by stockholders who for one reason or another
5. Thus the stockholder is acutely aware of the investment costs charge-
able to income and of the discount on the liquidating value of his security,
which latter may in part result from these costs and in part from the lack
of a ready market. Taxes, of course, are a substantial element in these
costs. In fact, the tax burden is believed by many to be excessive. In this
connection see Sen. Rep. No. 1775 (1940) 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 12; H. R.
Rep. No. 2639 (1940) 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 10. Also, for a brief state-
ment of some of the factors involved, see the writer's testimony on the Sec-
ond Revenue Act of 1940 at the Joint Hearings before the Committee on
Ways and Means, House of Representatives, and the Committee on Finance,
United States Senate (1940) 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 234.
6. Leverage companies are almost exclusively closed-end.
7. Unit trusts, mostly fixed or semi-fixed, although dating back as far
as 1924, attained their rapid growth after the market decline of late 1929.
They were to a large extent the forerunners of the open-end companies,
although some of the latter were of earlier origin, and were in effect sup-
planted by the open-enders. They are now relatively few in number, and
their securities are not being currently issued.
Face amount certificate companies constitute really a separate subject
in themselves. They are companies which sell certificates on an installment
payment basis, such certificates calling for payment of a fixed amount at a
stated time.
19411
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desire to cash in on their shares, the open-end companies must
engage in continuous selling of new shares of stock in order to
replace the funds so withdrawn.8 In closed-end companies, on
the other hand, as in the ordinary corporation, a stockholder has
no such right, although it is not unusual for closed-end companies
in their discretion to buy in their shares when selling at a dis-
count below liquidating value. The leverage company is a com-
pany which has outstanding senior securities, whether in the
form of bank borrowings, notes, or preferred stock. As 'these
senior securities constitute a fixed first charge on the assets of
the company, fluctuation in the underlying value of the common
stock will be greater than the fluctuation of the value of the
total assets of the investment company, depending in degree
upon the ratio of the senior securities to the total assets of the
company. For so long as there are assets sufficient to cover the
sums to which the senior securities are entitled on liquidation,
all gains and losses accrue to or come out of the common stock.
Thus the senior security acts as a lever on the value of the junior
security and so the structure or process is known as "leverage."
This, of course, is just as true in the case of an industrial, rail-
road, or utility company, but in those enterprises the effect of
the leverage, except in-respect of earnings, is not so apparent
since the assets of these companies have no quoted market value
against which the relative interest of the common stock can be
periodically checked.
By and large, the decade of the 1920's, and parlicularly the
later years of this decade, was the period of the formation of
closed-end investment companies. Many of these companies were
sponsored by, and affiliated with, investment or brokerage houses.
During this golden era these financial houses appeared to have
a magic touch and there existed throughout the country a tre-
mendous demand for securities of investment companies affiliated
with these concerns. It was expected and hoped that the invest-
ment companies would participate in the businesses of the finan-
cial firms with which they were affiliated. So great was the
demand, that most investment company securities promptly sold
at large premiums over liquidating values. Control by an invest-
8. An outstanding exception is State Street Investment Corporation, of
Boston, which has not issued any new shares or liquidated any old shares
for a number of years.
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ment house was considered an asset, and stockholders, having
faith in the integrity of these firms, felt it to their advantage
that the officers and directors and their affiliates should be able
to deal freely with the investment companies. With the crash
and the subsequent depression, the prestige of the financial com-
munity suffered greatly. The necessity of stockholders to realize
cash for their stock brought about a condition where the supply
was greatly in excess of the demand. Frauds were uncovered
on the part of some managements and the stock of investment
companies formerly selling at a premium now almost uniformly
began to sell at a discount. It was then that the *unit trusts,
primarily with fixed portfolios, and the open-end companies first
came into prominence.9 The ability to cash in at liquidating
value was an appealing selling point, with the stock of closed-end
companies selling at a discount. The emphasis in the selling of
these shares was on the diversified portfolio and ready liquidity
of each shareholder's interest. Most open-end companies had no
banker or broker affiliations, although many were controlled
either by their investment advisers or the distributors of their
securities or by persons acting in both capacities.
The main abuses which developed in the investment company
industry were abuses related to the nature of investment com-
panies and their affiliations." The liquidity of their capital assets
made more easy their embezzlement or theft or their use for
improper purposes. Dealings between investment companies and
affiliated persons, expressly permitted for greater flexibility and
to enable the investment companies to share in the theretofore
profitable enterprises of those persons, also made possible im-
proper transactions by the unscrupulous. In fact many in the
industry came to believe that even in the best of faith dealings
as principals between affiliated persons and investment com-
panies were in the main inadvisable and had already voluntarily
abandoned this practice. In the open-end field abuse was related
mostly to selling. High pressure sales methods were often in-
dulged in. Stockholders were "switched" from one company to
another with no apparent advantage except to the salesman who
9. With management at a discount the fixed trusts, offering an interest
in a specified list of diversified securities, appealed to many. But experience
soon showed their rigidity to be inadvisable.
10. See Sen. Rep. No. 1775 (1940) 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. 6-8.
1941]
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received a commission at the expense of the purchaser. With
the purchase price of stock based on the liquidating value of the
preceding day's close, customers were encouraged to purchase
-on rising markets to the disadvantage of existing stockholders."
Accentuating the need for regulation, was the fact that the aver-
age stockholder of an investment company was likely to be a
:man of small means and little financial experience. 12
The original bill to regulate investment companies followed in
many respects the pattern of recent federal legislation. Concepts
of regulation were borrowed in particular from the Public Util-
ity Holding Company Act;13 the Chandler Act,14 regulating the
reorganization of companies in bankruptcy; the Securities Ex-
,change Act;15 and in some respects the Securities Act of 1933.10
Precedent could even be found in certain provisions of the bank-
ing laws'- and of the Civil Aeronautics Act."8 True, the invest-
ment company situation had problems of its own for the solution
of which there were no precedents to draw upon, and in addi-
tion the original bill was in some respects more drastic than any
,of the precedents referred to. While the bill as introduced con-
tained no "death sentence" for senior securities,"' senior securi-
ties were to be prohibited in the future; reorganizations, even
of solvent companies, were to require the approval of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission; voting rights were to be "equi-
tably" readjusted in the discretion of the Commission; and in
general very large discretionary powers as to various types of
transactions, almost in the nature of "blank checks," were vested
in the Commission.
11. See discussion infra, page 330.
12. See Sen. Rep. No. 1775 (1940) 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 4.
13. (1935) 49 Stat. 803, 15 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940) sec. 79.
14. (1938) 52 Stat. 840, 11 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940) sec. 201.
15. (1934) 48 Stat 881, 15 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940) sec. 78a.
16. (1933) 48 Stat. 74, 15 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940) sec. 77a.
17. Especially the sections relating to the independence of officers and
,directors, the segregation of investment banking and commercial banking
functions and underwriting affiliations. In this connection see (1933) 48
Stat. 193, 188, and 189, 12 U. S. C. A. sees. 78, 377, and 378; (1913) 38
'Stat. 273, 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 605.
18. (1938) 52 Stat. 977, 49 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940) see. 401.
19. This had been seriously considered in previous drafts but had been
eliminated, together with certain other provisions, upon objections raised
'by representatives of the industry at conferences had with the Securities
and Exchange Commission before the introduction of the bill. At these con-
ferences the principles, but not the actual text, of the proposed bill were
,discussed.
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That there were precedents or analogies in other federal legis-
lation for provisions of the bill which were objectionable to mem-
bers of the industry, constituted but cold comfort for investment
company executives. While most recognized that some measure
of regulation was necessary for the protection of investors and
was essentially to the best interests of the industry, or was in
any event inevitable, the bill as originally introduced could not
be accepted. It was generally understood that the bill had little
if any chance of final passage in the then current session of
Congress. Some believed that there was no need for any action
by investment companies and there was a reluctance on the part
of many to appear at the public hearings and thus unnecessarily
attract attention to themselves. Others believed that the hear-
ings would at least constitute a preliminary skirmish in a cam-
paign which was not to end with that session of Congress and
that it was highly desirable that they appear at the hearings and
make a record for the future in respect of the proposed legisla-
tion. On this basis a relatively small group, acting primarily for
themselves but in consultation with others, appeared at the hear-
ings. They expressed their points of opposition to the bill as
introduced, but at the same time stated their acceptance of the
principle of reasonable legislation and defined in general terms
what legislation appeared to them to be appropriate.
Towards the close of the extensive hearings of the Senate
Committee, it seemed desirable that there be formulated for the
record a concise statement of the principles of regulation which
might be acceptable to members of the industry and there was
thereupon prepared and presented to the Senate Committee a
statement of this character subscribed to by virtually all of the
investment companies which had appeared at the hearing.20 It
thereafter became apparent that a basis existed for negotiation
between the Securities and Exchange Commission and represen-
tatives of the industry of a bill which might be acceptable to both.
With the approval and encouragement of Senator Wagner, chair-
man of the Senate Committee, such negotiations were under-
taken.2 1 An agreement in principle, set forth in memorandum
20. See the testimony of Mr. Arthur H. Bunker in the Hearings before
a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3580
(1940) 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1053 et seq.
21. See Sen. Rep. No. 1775 (1940) 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1.
19411
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form, was arrived at promptly and upon canvassing the leading
companies in the industry was subscribed to by them.22 There
followed the redrafting of the bill by the staff of the Commission
and representatives of the industry.23 The bill as so redrafted
was submitted to the industry and again the endorsement of a
large section of the industry was received. The revised bill was
thereupon recommended to the Senate Committee jointly by the
Securities and Exchange Commission and members of the in-
dustry.2 4 After further hearings, the Senate Committee reported
it favorably in substantially the form submitted.
Considerable reluctance was at first encountered in the House
to a consideration of investment company legislation at that ses-
sion, particularly in view of the fact that an early adjournment
was expected. However, upon satisfying itself that legislation
was desired by both the Commission and the industry,2 and that
its passage was still possible at that session, a sub-committee of
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Comilerce, under
the chairmanship of Congressman Cole, after familiarizing itself
thoroughly with the proceedings before the Senate Committee,
held brief hearings and thereafter reported the bill favorably
with relatively minor changes. Subsequently the bill was passed
in both houses with no opposition. 2
The passage of such comprehensive legislation with virtually
22. See Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 10065 (1940) 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 95
et seq.
23. In these negotiations, as throughout the whole proceeding, the Com-
mission was represented by Judge Healy, one of its members, and by Mr.
David Schenker who was in charge of the investigation and who is now
head of the Investment Company Division of the Commission. Under Judge
Healy's general supervision, the revised bill was drafted by Mr. Schenker,
assisted by Messrs. John Hollands, Harry Heller, and Mrs. Rella Reznick
Swartz. The closed-end companies were represented by the writer and the
open-end companies by Mr. Warren Motley of Boston. That each party
was impressed with the fairness of the other throughout the whole proceed-
ing was testified to at the Senate Hearings. See Hearings before a Sub-
committee of the Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3580, 76th
Cong. (1940) 3rd Sess., 1107, 1130.
24. See Sen. Rep. No. 1775 (1940) 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1, 2.
25. See H. R. Rep. No. 2639 (1940) 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 5.
26. Earlier an effort had been made to place the bill on the unanimous
consent calendar of the Senate, at which time the discussion was principally
taken up with consideration of the propriety of the procedure, there being
little debate on the merits of the bill. See 86 Cong. Rec., June 21, 1940, at
13385.
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no debate is probably without precedent.27 The constructive atti-
tude of the industry and the wholehearted cooperation between
the Commission and the industry was indeed a significant event.28
Whether or not by endorsing a reasonable bill in the last session
more stringent legislation at a later session was avoided, it is
the conviction of the writer that the enactment of the Investment
Company Act of 1940, particularly as the result of a coibpera-
tive effort, was of primary benefit to the investment company
industry. The Act not only protects investors, but in setting
specific standards for management affords protection to officers
and directors as well.
A detailed comparison of the investment company bill as origi-
nally introduced with the Act as finally passed will be interest-
ing to some. In -evaluating the changes it must be remembered
that most open-end companies, as they are constantly selling their
securities, are subject to the provisions of the Securities Act of
1933 and to stringent provisions of various Blue Sky laws; that
most of the leading closed-end companies and some of the open-
end companies are subject to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, being listed on national security exchanges; that the Act
is in essence compromise legislation; and it should be noted that
situations prohibited as to the future are frequently not affected
to the extent already existing, in part out of deference to the
Constitution, in part out of recognition of the injustice of de-
stroying existing rights and in part as the inevitable result of
compromise. In general, the industry objected to restrictive or
regulatory legislation in respect to matters which were not pecu-
liar to investment companies. In the bill as originally intro-
duced a very large measure of discretion was vested in the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission to formulate standards, to impose
restrictions, and to regulate conduct. Under the Act as passed
there was vested great discretion in the Commission, but in the
main the standards and maximum prohibitions are definitely pre-
scribed and the discretion vested in the Commission is to grant
exceptions either by rules and regulations to cover general types
of situations or by order in specific cases.
27. It is perhaps only fair to point out that the Congressional mind was
then pretty much preoccupied with matters of national defense.
28. See 86 Cong. Rec., August 1, 1940, at 14924; 86 Cong. Rec., August
8, 1940, at 15413.
19411
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DEFINITIONS
The major problem in defining an investment company lay in
drawing the line between an investment company and a holding
company. On the one extreme there is the company whose sole
business is the investing and reinvesting of its funds in diver-
sified securities-obviously an investment company-and on the
other, the company whose assets consist solely of stock of wholly
owned subsidiaries not engaged in the investment business-
obviously a holding company.
Except for face amount certificate companies which are not
discussed in this article, the Act defines as an investment com-
pany any issuer which (1) is, or holds itself out to be, engaged
primarily in the business of investing or trading in securities,
or (2) is engaged in the business of investing, trading in or
owning securities and over 40% of whose assets, as therein
defined, consists of investment securities, that is, securities other
than government securities or those of majority owned non-
investment company subsidiaries. This latter is the so-called
statistical test for determining whether or not in the first in-
stance companies fall within the investment company or the
holding company category. But notwithstanding the effect of
this statistical test, no company is an investment company (1)
if it is primarily engaged directly or through wholly owned sub-
sidiaries in a business or businesses other than that of investing,
owning, or trading in securities; (2) if upon application the
Commissioner finds it to be primarily engaged in a business or
businesses other than that of investing, owning, or trading in
securities either directly or (a) through majority owned sub-
sidiaries or (b) through controlled companies conducting simi-
lar types of business; or (3) if it is a company all of the out-
standing securities of which (other than short time paper and
directors' qualifying shares) are directly or indirectly owned by
a company excepted from the definition of investment company
-by (1) or (2) above.2 9
Thus, where an exemption is based on wholly owned subsidi-
aries the company may itself determine whether or not it is an
investment company within the meaning of the Act, while in
the other two cases the company must apply to the Commission
29. There have been filed with the Commission over 30 applications for
exemption under these provisions.
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for an order. The latter procedure, however, has the advantage
that if successful the company has the protection of a deter-
mination by a competent authority ° The apparent reason for
the more limited exception in respect of controlled companies is
that any more general exemption would have exempted from the
Act a number of companies of the type believed to require regu-
lation."
It is far from easy in many cases to determine what the pri-
mary business of a company may be. Unless at least 40 per cent
of the assets of a company, speaking generally, are investment
securities, the question does not arise. But possibly over 50 or
60 per cent of a company's assets may be invested in investment
securities and still the company may claim that its primary busi-
ness is something other than such as to bring it within the pur-
view of the Act. Clearly the proportion of assets is not the test,
because the exception is based upon the nature of the business
primarily engaged in, notwithstanding the result of the statis-
tical asset test. Relative income, gross or net, from various assets
may be a factor. As always, it is only the borderline cases that
cause difficulty and it is probable that the decisive factor must
be the company's own determination of what constitutes its chief
business, not a determination made for the purposes of the Act
but a determination evidenced by the conduct of its business.
A miscellaneous group of exceptions from the scope of the
definition of investment companies relates to companies with less
than 100 stockholders, dealers in and underwriters of securities,
20. It is believed that the Commission would be inclined to take juris-
diction to make a determination as to a company claiming exemption under
the first provision, upon application by such company, even though juris-
diction to do so is not specifically spelled out in the Act. The Commission is,
of course, not bound by the conclusion reached by a company that it is
exempt under the first provision, and if the Commission believed that a
company which had not registered was included within the jurisdiction of
the Act it undoubtedly would, after inquiry, take appropriate steps against
the delinquent company.
31. In connection with the language of the exemption-primarily en-
gaged, directly or through wholly owned or majority owned or controlled
companies-the question has been raised as to whether the company which
is claiming exemption must itself be participating in the business of the
subsidiary or controlled companies. It is submitted that for the purpose of
this section the business of the subsidiary or controlled company is the
business of its parent and that it would defeat the purposes of the exemp-
tion if the language were construed to mean that the parent company must
itself participate in the business of the subsidiary or controlled companies.
19411
Washington University Open Scholarship
314 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26
banks and bank holding company affiliates, public utility holding
companies, et cetera.32
Investment companies are classified as "face amount certifi-
cate companies," "unit investment trusts," and "management
companies," the latter as previously indicated being the only
type discussed in this article. Management companies are in turn
subclassified into open-end and closed-end companies 33 and into
diversified and non-diversified companies. A diversified company
must have at least 75 per cent of the value of its total assets in
cash, cash items, government securities, securities of other in-
vestment companies, and other securities limited in respect of
any one issuer to an amount not greater in value than 5 per cent
of the value of the total assets of such management company and
to not more than 10 per cent of the outstanding voting securi-
ties of such issuer.3 4 The 25 per cent reservoir is permitted for
purposes of flexibility.
As to the general definitions in the Act, there is in the main
little which calls for special comment. Many of the definitions
follow closely, if not verbatim, similar definitions in the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Atten-
tion is, however, called to the definitions of the words "affiliated
person," "assignment," "control," "redeemable security," "reor-
ganization," and "value."' 8
32. See also exemptions under sec. 6. In this section is contained one of
the most sweeping grants of power contained in the Act: the power given
the Commission, by rules and regulations or by order, conditional or uncon-
ditional, to exempt any person, security, or transaction or any class or
classes thereof from any of the provisions of the Act. See. 6 (c).
33. See page 305, supra.
34. The distinction between diversified and non-diversified companies is
due in large part, it is believed, to a desire to inform stockholders of the
character of the portfolio of the company in which they have invested.
But note restrictions on changing from a diversified to a non-diversified
company discussed infra, p. 316. Furthermore it was anticipated, and cor-
rectly so, that the distinction might be made the basis for difference in tax
treatment and the definition of a diversified company in the original bill
(sec. 5(b) (1) of S. 3580) was vigorously challenged. The Second Revenue
Act of 1940, passed subsequent to the Investment Company Act of 1940,
did actually exempt diversified management companies as well as "mutual"
companies from the excess profits tax. See sec. 727(d) of subchapter E
of the Internal Revenue Code, as added to the Code by Title II of the Sec-
ond Revenue Act of 1940.
35. The words "affiliated persons," with their pyramided counterpart,
"affiliated person of an affiliated person," appear frequently in the Act.
The latter is far reaching in scope and often requires elaborate charting to
determine its ramifications. So remote may be the connection of an affili-
ated person that the word "knowingly" has been inserted in many cases
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss3/2
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REGISTRATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES
AND CHANGES IN INVESTMENT POLICY
The Act follows the familiar pattern of prohibiting use of the
mails or instrumentalities of interstate commerce to domestic
investment companies unless registered and thereafter imposes
limitations and restrictions on registered companies. 6  Foreign
companies are prohibited only in respect of the sale of their
securities within the United States, with power in the Commis-
sion to permit such sales where it finds it both legally and prac-
tically feasible to enforce the provisions of the Act against any
foreign company.37
to protect innocent infringements of the Act which are bound to follow
from such widespread prohibitions. It is, therefore, important whenever
the expression "affiliated person of an affiliated person" appears to diagram
carefully the extent to which the applicable prohibitions may apply.
In respect of the definition of "assignment" it should be noted that this
includes any transfer of a controlling block of the assignor's outstanding
voting securities. Thus an assignment of an investment advisory or dis-
tributing contract within the provisions of Section 15 may be effected, not
merely by the assignment of the contract itself, but by a transfer of con-
trol of the person holding such contract.
The definition of "control" is an attempt to solve the problem caused
by lack of definition of this word and consequent uncertainty as to its
meaning under other acts. Pri, facie, the beneficial owner of 25 per cent
or more of the voting securities of a company is presumed to exercise
control of such company and, conversely, any person who does not own
25 per cent of the voting securities is presumed not to be a controlling
person. Provision is made for a determination in a proceeding by the Com-
mission rebutting any such presumption. In the absence of such definition
under other acts, the question has arisen whether an individual, because
of possible dominating personality, as president, chairman of the board, or
director, for example, might be deemed to control a corporation in spite of
a relatively small stock ownership. Or whether some individual, because
of relationship to some other person, perhaps an employee or a relative,
might be deemed to be a controlled person. Important consequences might
flow from the fact or absence of control, making certainty of interpretation
a matter of prime importance. It should be noted that the word "control"
appears a number of times in the important definition of "affiliated per-
son." A natural person is presumed not to be a controlled person.
The definition of "redeemable security" is significant because it is upon
this definition that the subsequent definition of "open-end companies" de-
pends. A redeemable security is one, other than a short term paper, under
the terms of which the holder is entitled on presentation to receive approxi-
mately his proportionate share of the issuer's current net assets or the cash
equivalent thereof.
The importance of the definition of "reorganization" lies in the fact
that it includes types of transactions which may not commonly be thought
of as reorganizations. Substantive results, beyond mere interpretations, are
thus effected by definition here as in other places.
This applies also to the definition of "value" which contains substantive
provisions effecting the determination of values.
36. See sec. 7.
37. See see. 7(d).
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In general, the information required upon registration follows
the requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, with provision for elimination of dupli-
cation.3 8 In addition every registered company is required to
recite its policy as to classification and subclassification, borrow-
ing money, issuance of senior securities, engaging in the busi-
ness of underwriting, concentrating investments in a particular
industry or group of industries, purchase and sale of real estate
and commodities, making loans to other persons and portfolio
turn-over. The latter must include a statement showing the
aggregate total amount of the purchases and sales of portfolio
securities in each of the last three full fiscal years. A statement
of policy is also required as to any other matters which the regis-
trant elects to treat as a matter of fundamental policy.3 1 The
recital of policy is to contain a statement of whether the regis-
trant reserves freedom of action to engage in any particular type
of activity and, if such freedom of action is reserved, a statement
briefly indicating in so far as practicable the extent to which the
registrant intends to engage therein.40
Changes in subclassification from open-end to closed, or vice
versa, or from a diversified to a non-diversified company are not
permitted unless authorized by a vote of the majority of out-
standing voting securities. Nor without such vote may a regis-
tered company borrow money, issue senior securities, underwrite
securities, purchase or sell real estate or commodities, make loans,
except in accordance with the recitals of policy contained in its
registration statement or deviate from its policy as to concen-
tration of investments or from any fundamental policy which
it has elected to treat as such, nor change the nature of its busi-
ness so as to cease to be an investment company.41 In the case
of common law trusts where no voting securities are issued, pro-
vision is made for corresponding approval of the holders of a
majority of outstanding shares.42
38. See sec. 8.
39. See sec. 8(b). The original bill gave to the Commission wide discre-
tion as to information to be required on registration and in determining
what should constitute matters of fundamental policy, the latter both in
general and as to specific companies. See Sec. 8 (b) of S. 3580.
40. The original bill required registration, as well, of officers, directors,
and certain other affiliated persons. Sec. 9.
41. See see. 13 (a).
42. See see. 13 (b).
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The reason for these provisions would seem obvious. Under
existing corporate law it has been possible, and indeed quite
generally the practice, to formulate charter provisions of such
broad scope as to permit almost limitless discretion in the man-
agement as to the types of business to be entered into, even
where no exercise of such discretion was contemplated. There
have been cases where investment companies substantially
changed the nature and character of their business without stock-
holders' approval or, indeed, without any notice to stockholders
and opportunity for objection. The above provisions are intended
to meet this problem by preventing any fundamental change in
the character of the business to be conducted without stockhold-
ers' approval.43
AFFILIATIONS OF OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, RESTRICTIONS ON
TRANSACTIONS IN WHICH THEY ARE INVOLVED,
AND RELATED MATTERS
The more radical of investment company critics have insisted
that investment companies must be segregated from any invest-
ment banker, security dealer, broker or similar person, and from
any person acting as its investment adviser or distributor of its
securities-that is to say, that all such persons should be ex-
cluded from acting as officers or directors of investment com-
panies. Further proposed restrictions would have prevented any
officer or director of an investment company from being an officer
or director of any other investment company, of any bank, or of
any corporation whose securities might be held in the portfolio
of the investment company.
The charge had been made that investment companies fre-
quently were operated, not primarily in the interests of their
stockholders, but in the interests of controlling groups or groups
represented on the board of directors. Specifically, there have
been instances of investment houses selling securities to affiliated
investment companies under circumstances which at worst consti-
tuted a conscious unloading of securities on the investment com-
43. It would be possible through the use of broad generalities in the
statement of fundamental policies to circumvent completely the purposes
of these provisions. On the other hand, too little flexibility in a statement
of policy might seriously hamper legitimate operations of an investment
company. Accordingly, the rules and regulations and the forms and ac-
companying instructions to be issued by the Commission under this section
will be of great importance.
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pany and at best a bad bargain for the investment company.
Where the investment company was not bargaining at arm's
length, it may have fared badly even though the individuals in-
volved intended to act in good faith and in the best interests of
the investment company. Charges were made that securities of
investment companies were turned over rapidly, that is to say,
frequent switches were made in investments, not with a primary
view to the good of the investment company, but with one eye on
brokerage commissions to be derived. Distributors of investment
company securities who controlled investment companies were
said to place undue emphasis on selling to the detriment of man-
agement. In fact the conflict-of-interest school went so far as to
suggest that any conceivable conflict of interest on the part of an
officer or director of an investment company should be outlawed,
that any director of an investment company who is also a director
of a company whose stock is held by the investment company,
no matter in what small amount, must inevitably violate his
duties to one or the other or both.44
The investigating staff of the Commission, to its credit, ap-
proached these problems with an open mind, leaving for deter-
mination at the end of the investigation the question of whether
or not to recommend the drastic segregation above referred to.41
The conclusion finally reached by the Commission was not to
recommend such segregation, although proposing safeguards in
the way of prohibitions considerably beyond those in the bill as
finally enacted. Their investigation had apparently convinced
the Commission that the record of so-called independent invest-
ment companies was at least no better than that of those with
the affiliations referred to and that the major possibilities of
abuse could be taken care of in other ways. Perhaps the Com-
mission was also somewhat impressed with the argument that
44. Unfortunately life is full of conflicts of interest and they cannot be
eliminated entirely. A lawyer has a code of ethics which guides him under
similar circumstances and there is no reason why there cannot be developed,
as indeed there has and is being developed, a code of business conduct which
will assist honorable men in determining their conduct when questions of
possible conflict arise. To the extent reasonably feasible major conflicts
should be eliminated. But there is always a question of balancing the bene-
fit against the detriment. The detriment is overwhelmingly large when the
result of a prohibition would be to deprive investment companies of the
opportunity of obtaining desirable directors by reason of the remote possi-
bility of a conflict of interest.
45. See page 317, supra.
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securities of some investment companies were sold with the ex-
press representation to stockholders that such investment com-
panies would be affiliated with and managed by particular invest-
ment or brokerage houses and doubtless bought by stockholders
for that very reason. The fact that a number of the practices
which seemed undesirable had already been abandoned by many
in the industry was undoubtedly also a factor.
The provisions of the Act which deal primarily with the prob-
lems just discussed are Section 10, entitled "Affiliations of Direc-
tors," Section 15 dealing with "Investment Advisory and Under-
writing Contracts," and Section 17 entitled "Transactions of Cer-
tain Affiliated Persons and Underwriters." 6
In the main Section 10, as finally enacted, provides that in-
vestment companies must have a minority of at least 40 per cent
of directors who are not affiliated with the management 7 and
must have a majority of its directors independent of brokers as
a group, principal underwriters of its securities as a group,48
and investment bankers as a group.49 No investment company
is permitted to have a majority of its board of directors consist-
ing of persons who are officers or directors of any one bank, but
the few existing situations are left undisturbed in this respect.50
The theory of these provisions is (1) that it is desirable that
all investment company transactions be subject to the scrutiny
46. See also sec. 9 which disqualifies persons convicted of certain offenses
from acting as officer, director, etc. of an investment company.
47. Specifically, who are not "investment advisers of affiliated persons
of an investment adviser of, or officers or employees of, such registered in-
vestment company."
48. A special exemption is made to take care of the case of an open-end
investment company which is managed by an investment advisory firm and
whose securities are distributed only to the customers of such firm Here,
in essence, the investment company constitutes merely a medium for pooling
and thus managing more economically the investment funds of the firm's
customers. In these cases no sales load or commission is permitted on the
sale of securities of the investment company and this effectively limits the
scope of the exception. See sec. 10(d).
49. Here as in a number of other sections of the Act there is an
express exception in respect of "a company of the character described in
sec. 12(d) (3) (A) and (B)." The company referred to is one all of whose
stock is held by investment companies, and which is engaged in the busi-
ness of underwriting and dealing in securities. Obviously no conflict of
interest arises where the investment banker is a subsidiary of the invest-
ment company.
50. A further provision of sec. 10 limits the purchase by an investment
company of securities sold or underwritten by a syndicate where affiliated
persons are involved in the syndicate, even though the purchase is not made
from the affiliated person.
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of at least a minority of directors independent of the manage-
ment and (2) that in cases where affiliations of directors might
involve conflicts of interest, stockholders are entitled to the pro-
tection afforded by the existence of a majority of disinterested
directors. This latter protection, coupled with the specific pro-
hibitions on certain transactions of directors and affiliated per-
sons and the other safeguards of the Act,51 was deemed sufficient.
Several questions have already arisen under Section 10. For
example, is general counsel for an investment company an em-
ployee and therefore, if a director, one who cannot be included
in the requisite number of those independent of the management?
In the opinion of the writer, a lawyer is not usually an employee,
although he might be under particular circumstances, such as
if his sole employment were by the investment company. 2
Whether former employees or former partners of brokerage,
banking, or investment advisory firms can qualify as directors
independent of these firms, is a question which has also arisen.
Clearly under the language of the Act, such persons can so
qualify unless there has been a determination that they are per-
sons controlled by such brokerage, banking, or investment ad-
visory firms.53 However, investment companies have wished to
be sure that they were complying not merely with the letter but
also with the spirit of the Act. As to whether the spirit of the
Act is complied with in any given case would seem to depend
upon the particular facts of that case. After all, a former part-
ner of a banking house may in fact be decidedly more inde-
pendent of such firm than, say, an insurance broker who receives
large amounts of insurance business through that firm. The Act,
in discarding extreme remedies and taking a middle course, pre-
supposes good faith on the part of the investment companies and
their managements. In the long run it will be the measure of
good faith with which the industry endeavors to live up to the
spirit of the Act which will determine to what extent moderate
governmental regulation can be successful and to what extent,
51. For example, the requirements of disclosure through reports and the
general supervisory powers of the Commission discussed infra, pages 340-
341, 343.
52. In view of the doubts expressed by the Commission on this subject,
it is unlikely that any investment company will wish to include counsel, or
-members of any firm which is counsel, in the category of directors inde-
pendent of the management.
53. See definitions of "affiliated person" and "control," sees. 2 (a) (3) and
2(a) (9).
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granting the need for regulation, extreme measures may be neces-
sary.
Section 17 of the Act supplements the provisions requiring
so-called independent directors, with specific prohibitions against
certain transactions with affiliated persons. Thus no affiliated
person, promoter of or principal underwriter for a registered
investment company or any affiliated person of such person, pro-
moter, or principal underwriter, may knowingly sell any security
or other property to or borrow any money or purchase any secu-
rity or other property from such registered company or any com-
pany controlled by such registered company.54 There is excepted
from the prohibition against sale, securities of which the buyer
is the issuer (so that the investment company may purchase its
own stock from affiliated persons as well as others55), and also
securities of which the seller is the issuer and which are part
of a general offering to the holders of a class of its securities.
As the prohibition is primarily designed to prevent special trans-
actions on the part of insiders of which stockholders may never
be advised, this latter exception is obviously reasonable as well
as desirable. The limitation on purchases from investment com-
panies does not apply to securities of which the seller is the
issuer. Any sweeping prohibition may involve hardship and un-
reasonable restraints and instead of protecting stockholders may,
in specific cases, work to their disadvantage by preventing desir-
able transactions. Accordingly, the Act provides that upon appli-
cation the Commission may exempt any proposed transaction
from the above described provisions if it finds that its terms,
including the consideration to be paid or received, are reasonable
and fair and do not involve overreaching on the part of any per-
son concerned and that the proposed transaction is consistent
with the policy of each registered investment company concerned
and with the general purposes of the Act.
Section 17 further regulates participations by investment com-
panies in underwritings of affiliated persons and limits the com-
mission which any affiliated person may receive when acting as
broker for an investment company. While he may act as broker
in the distribution of securities owned by an investment com-
54. Note exception in respect of a company described in 12(d) (3) (A)
and (B). See note 49 supra.
55. See sec. 23 (c) discussed at page 329, infra.
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pany, he cannot act as distributor if the transaction takes such
form that the affiliated person buys for his own account in mak-
ing the distribution. To the extent that this distinction may not
be one of substance, it is possible that rules and regulations may
be promulgated permitting an affiliated person to act as distribu-
tor even in cases where the transaction takes the form of a pur-
chase by him from the investment company.
One major question of interpretation has already arisen in
connection with the foregoing provisions. In a proposed merger
between an investment company and a company affiliated with
it, the point was raised as to whether this would require the
approval of the Commission on the ground that the merger might
be deemed to involve a "sale" by an affiliated person to an in-
vestment company. In this connection note that by definition the
word "sale" includes "any disposition."' 6 However, in view of
the definition of the word "reorganization ' 7 and the section
dealing specifically with that subject,58 the legislative history of
the Act which shows the abandonment of the proposal that the
Commission be given general power to pass on reorganizations,",
and the particular use of the word "sell" throughout Section 17,
the writer does not believe tenable the suggestion that a merger
comes within the prohibition on sales. Such view seems to have
been accepted at least tentatively by the Commission.
A further provision of Section 17 makes unlawful any charter,
by-law, or other provision which purports to protect any director
or officer of an investment company and certain other persons
against liability for wilful misfeasance, bad faith, gross negli-
gence, or reckless disregard of his duties. This appears simple
enough on its face, but it has given rise to the question of
whether it affects proposals to provide for indemnity to directors
for counsel fees incurred in successfully defending themselves
against unjust litigation. The wording of any such provision
must be scrutinized in reference to this section of the Act.
Furthermore, existing clauses in charters permitting directors
to deal as principals with investment companies, whether or not
such clauses purport to protect them from liability as to any such
56. See sec. 2(a) (33).
57. See sec. 2 (a) (32).
58. See sec. 25.
59. See discussion infra,-pages 339-340.
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dealings conducted in good faith, require reappraisal. To the
extent that any action under a charter provision of this sort is
in violation of the express prohibitions of the Act, any such
action would, of course, be unlawful under federal law. How-
ever, in a civil suit brought against directors in a state court,
such a charter provision might well be upheld and the directors
relieved of liability. On this basis it would seem that a charter
clause of this character is in violation of the prohibition against
exculpatory clauses which protect directors against wilful mis-
feasance-i. e., a violation of the Act.
Section 15 regulates investment advisory and distributing con-
tracts. These are permitted for periods of two years only, but
may be renewed annually thereafter by action of the board of
directors. An investment advisory contract must have been ini-
tially approved by a majority vote of stockholders and must be
subject to termination at any time on sixty days' notice. Both
types of contract must be subject to automatic termination in
the event of their assignment by the investment adviser or dis-
tributor.6 Contracts in existence prior to March 15, 1940 are
permitted to run until March 15, 1945.
At least one provision of the original bill received more or
less universal approbation. That was the provision now found
in Section 16 (a) stating that no person may serve as a director
of a registered investment company unless elected by stockhold-
ers at an annual or a special meeting duly called for that pur-
pose, except, in effect, that vacancies occurring between such
meetings, not in excess of one-third in all, may be filled in any
otherwise legal manner. This provision, it was universally
agreed, should prevent the recurrence of a situation which had
on several occasions led to serious losses to stockholders. Direc-
tors had turned over control to a new board without stockhold-
ers' action, and indeed without notice to stockholders, by the
familiar procedure of successive single resignations of directors
immediately supplanted by new members.6 1
It is true that even with this provision, voting control of an
investment company could be purchased by unscrupulous persons
who could thereupon elect new directors and presumably have
60. See definition of "assignment" discussed in note 35, supra.
61. See Gerdes v. Reynolds, decided by the New York Supreme Court on
February 18, 1941, and as yet unreported.
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the company operated to their advantage rather than in the
interests of stockholders. Under Section 16 stockholders are at
least put on notice of any proposed change and a regular cor-
porate vote is required for such purpose. Experience has shown
that the most scandalous practices were possible only where the
new management, which proposed to acquire its control with
the funds of the corporation itself, could step in without any
delay. Such delay, with stockholders' meeting regulated by the
proxy machinery, should go a long ways towards preventing at
least flagrant abuses and to giving dissatisfied stockholders suffi-
cient opportunity to avail themselves of normal legal remedies.
It is not possible, nor was it intended, that the Act should pre-
vent every conceivable abuse.62
FUNCTIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES
Under the heading "Functions and Activities of Investment
Companies" Section 12 of the Act deals with certain restrictions
on the activities of these companies. Closely related is subsection
(c) of Section 20, dealing with circular ownership. Section 21,
having to do with loans, is also somewhat related.
Section 12 prohibits a registered investment company, in con-
travention of rules and regulations prescribed by the Commission
and with certain exceptions (1) to purchase any securities on
margin, (2) to participate on a joint or a joint and several basis
in any trading account in securities, or (3) to effect a short sale
of any security. It seems hardly necessary to comment on these
restrictions except to state that it is doubtful whether many in-
vestment companies would be likely to indulge in any of these
prohibited transactions quite aside from the statute. 3
Open-end investment companies are prohibited from acting
as distributors of their own securities, except through an under-
writer, in contravention of rules and regulations prescribed by
the Commission. Apparently the Commission was particularly
fearful of the possibility that open-end investment companies in
their formative stages might be made to shoulder the unprofit-
62. Sec. 16(b) was designed to give some measure of protection in re-
spect of the few existing true trusts, in the strict legal sense, where no pro-
vision exists for the election of trustees.
63. Note that these prohibitions are expressed as in contravention of
rules and regulations prescribed by the Commission. This formula is con-
trary to the general pattern of the Act. See discussion infra, pages 344, 346.
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able burden of selling and distributing their shares during this
period of heavy expense and small return, building up the invest-
ment company for the benefit of some controlling person.64
The most important prohibition in Section 12 is that designed
to prevent pyramiding. Investment companies are prohibited
from acquiring stock of other investment companies which would
result in a holding of more than 3 per cent of voting stock in
the case of a general investment company, and 5 per cent in
the case of a company whose policy is to concentrate its invest-
ments in a particular industry or group of industries. An excep-
tion is made in the case of investment companies already owning
25 per cent or more of the outstanding voting stock of another
investment company. As 25 per cent is viewed as representing
working control, acquisitions beyond that amount are considered
beneficial, tending in the direction of ultimate consolidation of
the companies involved. The Act leaves undisturbed existing
pyramided systems. Similar provisions prohibit purchase of stock
of insurance companies, except that 10 per cent is the limit in
this respect.
These provisions effectually put an end to future pyramiding
of investment companies with their attendant evils, consisting of
(1) the acquisition of control over large aggregations of capital
through relatively small investment in one company whose assets
are in turn used to purchase control of another company and so
on; (2) the possibility of excessive volatility in the securities of
the top company through pyramiding leverage upon leverage;
and (3) the complexity of the structure with the resultant diffi-
culty on the part of the uninitiated stockholder in appraising the
true value of his security.65 This complexity and some of the
64. Sec. 12(c) limits underwriting commitments permissible for diver-
sified investment companies to conform to the general qualifications as to
diversification applying to such companies.
65. Note sec. 14 dealing with size of investment companies. In the Act
as originally introduced investment companies were limited to definite dollar
amounts as to size, varying as to the classification within which they fell.
Two prime motives seem to have been behind this restriction: (1) the
desire to provide a link in the chain of sections designed to restrict the
control over other companies exercised by any one group, and (2) the
feeling that too large an aggregation of capital could not be efficiently
managed. The proposed size limitations were necessarily and admittedly
more or less arbitrarily fixed. The industry was opposed to any limitation
in size, taking the position that it was virtually without precedent and
arguing that any dollar limitation might become meaningless in case of
inflation or other devaluation of the purchasing power of the dollar. The
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evils above mentioned are magnified through cross and circular
ownership prohibited under Section 20.
It was deemed unwise that an investment company should be
a part owner, except with other investment companies, in a con-
cern conducting a business of underwriting and dealing in securi-
ties and, accordingly, any such ownership is probihited. While
this is a limitation on the permitted activity of investment com-
panies and appears in Section 12(d) (3), perhaps the prime evil
aimed at is one relating to possible abuse of position by affiliated
persons. It was, of course, recognized that if investment com-
panies were permitted themselves to engage in the business of
underwriting, there was no reason why, and possibly it was more
desirable that, they should conduct this business through an
underwriting subsidiary. In fact special exemptions from pro-
hibitions on affiliated persons are contained throughout the Act
in respect of this type of corporation.66
A special exemption from the prohibition against acquiring
stock in other investment companies is made as to a corporation
which might be organized with an aggregate capital not to ex-
ceed $100,000,000 to engage in the business of underwriting,
furnishing capital to industry, and financing promotional enter-
prises. A company, to qualify under the exception, must have
only one class of stock, all of which must be issued to investment
matter was settled by the insertion of the provision of sec. 14 (b), giving
the Commission authority to make a study of the subject at any time
that it thought that substantial further increase in size of investment com-
panies created a problem.
The other aspect of the question of size was that of a minimum size.
Both Commission and industry agreed that a minimum size was desirable,
primarily for the reason that the expense of operation of an investment
company on any proper basis could not be borne by a company with in-
sufficient assets. Another reason was to discourage irresponsible persons
from attempting to organize investment companies. The minimum size
provided for is $100,000, which amount is entirely inadequate to sustain
the costs of a properly run investment company. But this seemed to be
the largest amount that it was expedient to suggest. Even so this provision
met objection in the House Committee on Interstate Commerce, from a
member who believed that there was a real need in small communities for
local investment companies of a type not generally contemplated by the
Act. In these situations some local personage, enjoying the confidence of
the community, might manage without any staff and on a part time basis
investment funds of his neighbors, placing them primarily in local mort-
gages and possibly in local business enterprises. To take care of this type
of case the exemption provided for in sec. 6(d) was inserted in the Act.
See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on H. R. 10065 (1940) 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 117-120.
66. See see. 12 (d) (3) (A) and (B).
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companies, and no investment company is permitted to put more
than 5 per cent of its assets in such company. It was hoped that
this provision might pave the way for investment companies
themselves to pool a portion of their assets to engage in promo-
tional activities, particularly in the light of the needs of national
defense.
Under Section 21 no registered management company is per-
mitted to lend money to any person if such person controls or is
under common control with such registered company, nor in
contravention of any statement of policy to the contrary. This
prevents in effect what is known as upstream loans, that is, loans
from a subsidiary to a parent or to some company controlled by
the parent. But there is excepted a loan from a registered com-
pany to a company which owns all of the outstanding securities
of the registered company, as in that case there are no outside
interests to be considered. 7
DISTRIBUTION AND REPURCHASE OR REDEMPTION OF SECURITIES
Section 22 deals with distribution, redemption, and repurchase
of redeemable securities, that is to say, of the securities of open-
end companies, and Section 23 with the distribution and repur-
chase of securities of closed-end companies.
Section 23 provides that no registered closed-end company
shall issue any of its securities for services or for property other
than cash or securities ;6S or shall sell any common stock of which
it is the issuer at a price below the current net asset value of
such stock except (1) in connection with an offering to the
holders of one or more classes of its stock, (2) with the consent
of a majority of its common stockholders, (3) upon conversion
of a convertible security or upon the exercise of outstanding war-
rants, 9 or (4) under such other circumstances as the Commis-
sion may permit. It is evident that the prohibition against issu-
ing securities for services or property other than cash and securi-
ties was designed to eliminate the possibility of overreaching or
fraudulent practices on the part of so-called insiders. While
theoretically there might be occasions when the issue of securi-
ties for such consideration would be justified and in the best
67. See corresponding provision of sec. 17(a) (3).
68. Except as a dividend or distribution to its security holders or in
connection with a reorganization.
69. Future issuances of warrants are restricted under sec. 18.
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interests of the company, it did not seem likely that such occa-
sions would be frequent or that any serious inconvenience would
result to legitimate operations from such a prohibition. On the
other hand, the possibility of abuse was recognized and conse-
quently no objection was voiced to these provisions.
In connection with the prohibition against the sale of common
stock below current net asset value, it should be borne in mind
that except in unusual situations there would be no such neces-
sity for or advantage in obtaining additional capital as to war-
rant the sale of common stock at a price which would dilute the
equity of existing common stockholders. Unlike an industrial,
an investment company seldom has urgent need of additional
capital. An exception would be a situation in which additional
assets were required to prevent a default on the company's notes
under a touch-off provision, 70 in which event it is altogether un-
likely that common stock could be sold at all, or a case in which
an investment company desired to invest in some enterprise with
seeming opportunities of great profits for which it had insuffi-
cient capital. These situations would be rare and, if the necessity
arose, could be taken care of by the authority granted to the
Commission to grant exceptions by rules and regulations or
orders. On the other hand, the investigation of the Commission
had found that the issuance of common stock to favored persons
at less than true value was not an imaginary evil.
Section 23 further provides that no registered closed-end com-
pany shall purchase any securities of which it is the issuer except
(1) on a securities exchange or such other open market as the
Commission may designate, (2) pursuant to tenders, and (3)
under such other circumstances as the Commission may permit.
In the event of purchases on the open market, the purchasing
investment company must have informed its stockholders of its
intention to purchase stock within the preceding six months.
The purpose of these provisions must be clear. At one time
the Commission had some doubt as to whether an investment
company should be permitted to purchase its stock at all. But
the almost universal practice in this respect, on the one hand
giving the investment company the opportunity of profit if able
to purchase its stock at a discount below asset value and, on
70. A provision similar to a margin requirement.
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the other hand, affording a market to stockholders who might
not otherwise be able to dispose of their stock, seemed reasonable
so long as safeguarded by adequate protections. If purchases
are made on the open market or pursuant to tenders, in each
case after adequate notice, every stockholder has an equal oppor-
tunity to sell. Affiliated persons should have the same right as
others to take advantage of the corporation's desire to purchase
its own stock and these transactions are excepted from the pro-
visions of Section 17 (a). It is true that by these provisions the
corporation is cut off from favorable opportunities to make spe-
cial deals for large blocks of stock, an opportunity which is par-
ticularly likely to arise in view of the present distress of foreign
security holders. However, here, as in so many other cases, flexi-
bility is maintained by authority in the Commission to grant
exceptions. 71
The question has been raised as to whether the call for redemp-
tion of preferred stock or bonds constitutes a purchase falling
within the above restrictions. But under normal circumstances
it would seem clear that a call of preferred stock is a redemption
or liquidation and not a purchase and a call of bonds is a pay-
ment rather than a purchase within the meaning of this section.
This view, it is understood, has been accepted by the Commission.
A more difficult situation arises in respect of the designation of
an open market other than a securities exchange. It was felt that
a proper definition of or the establishment of appropriate restric-
tions in connection with any designated open market was a mat-
ter which would require further investigation and as to which
it was doubtful whether any fixed statutory standards should be
set. This seemed to be the type of quasi-legislation which, in
view of the need for flexibility, could best be left to the rules and
regulations of an expert body rather than prescribed in rigid
form by Congressional enactment.7 2
Section 22 of the Act which deals with the distribution, re-
demption, and repurchase of the stock of open-end companies,
is one of the most important sections in so far as open-end com-
panies are concerned. This is because in the case of open-end
71. A number of applications have already been granted permitting spe-
cial transactions of this character.
72. There seems to be a real question as to whether the Commission will
find that any open market exists, other than a national securities exchange,
which affords adequate protection for the purposes of this section.
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companies there is a constant process of redemption of outstand-
ing shares and sale of new shares. The ability to sell new shares
affects the very existence of open-end companies. Accordingly,
the company itself, as well as the distributors of its shares, has
every incentive to promote sales. Under these circumstances, and
with keen competition between companies in the sale of their
shares, it was natural that some questionable practices should
have developed. It furthermore became extremely difficult, and
in some instances impossible, for any one company or small group
of companies to raise standards and at the same time compete
with the others.
The major complaints were directed against so-called "dilu-
tion," the payment of excessive commissions to distributors and
dealers, and the character of supplemental sales literature.73
"Dilution" refers to dilution of the equity of existing stockhold-
ers in the assets of an investment company caused by the sale
of new stock at a price to the company below its then per share
asset value. The stocks of open-end companies are theoretically
sold at asset value, plus a premium or loading charge to cover
the amounts paid to distributors and dealers for the distribution
of the stock. As the purchaser thus pays for the selling cost, to
the extent that the fact coincides with the theory, the investment
company receives full value for its stock and no dilution occurs.
However, it has been the general practice of open-end companies
to sell their shares during a particular day on the basis of the
per share liquidating value at the close of the previous day. Ac-
cordingly, when sales are made on a rising market, the liquidat-
ing value per share on the day of sale is higher than the pur-
chase price received by the company and a dilution occurs. As
it is obviously to the advantage of the purchaser to buy stock
on a day when its liquidating value has risen above that on
which its price is based, and as a salesman is not likely to let
pass unnoticed any particular benefit to his prospective customer,
it is not unnatural that by and large the sale of stock of open-
73. See. 24(b) requires that copies of all sales literature be filed with
the Commission. Under the Securities Act of 1933, provided that a pros-
pectus meeting the requirements of the Act is delivered in connection with
the sale of a security, supplemental sales literature is free of supervision.
While the original bill required that all sales literature be subject to the
same scrutiny by the Commission as a prospectus, the Act merely requires
filing of such supplemental sales literature on the theory that this in itself
will tend to curb excesses.
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end companies is heaviest in days of rising markets. Thus what
might be a negligible dilution if it occurred only in isolated cases,
is of substantial significance when it becomes the general rule.
On days of extreme upward movements of stock prices this dilu-
tion in some cases reached very large proportions.7 4
It was charged that in some instances purchasers of open-end
shares on a rising market, by immediately redeeming their
shares, made profits with no risk to themselves whatsoever. This
was almost impossible for the public, because of the premium
paid over liquidating value. But officers and directors, when per-
mitted to purchase directly from the corporation and thus elimi-
nate the selling commission, and the principal underwriter or
distributor who normally purchases directly from the corpora-
tion, have been in position to indulge in this so-called riskless
trading at the expense of existing stockholders.
The remedies proposed were (1) against dilution, to require
the computation of the selling price as of a time more nearly
reflecting the true value of the stock; (2) against riskless trad-
ing, to permit sales without loading charge or premiums only to
distributors and to distributors only in connection with resales
to dealers and customers; and (3) as to excessive selling pre-
miums, to prohibit these. The original bill gave the Commission
jurisdiction in these matters.
The open-end companies and the distributors of their securi-
ties, however, asked to be given an opportunity themselves to
"police" their industry and to correct existing abuses of the
character described. The medium proposed was the National
Association of Security Dealers, registered under the so-called
Maloney Act.75 It was agreed that they should be given a period
of one year to make this attempt without interference by the
Commission and that at the expiration of one year the Commis-
sion should have similar powers. If the Commission was then
not satisfied with the regulations promulgated by the Associa-
tion it could step in and promulgate its own rules and regulations.
Accordingly, Section 22 (a) and (b) gives to a securities asso-
ciation registered under Section 15(a) of the Securities Ex-
74. On September 5, 1939, when the general market advanced some twelve
points, a number of companies stopped selling their shares to prevent further
dilution of the interests of existing stockholders.
75. 15 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940) sec. 78o(a).
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change Act of 1984 power to prescribe (1) methods, including
the time of calculation, for computing the price at which a mem-
ber may purchase or sell redeemable securities from or to any
investment company; (2) a minimum period of time to elapse
between the issue of any such security and its redemption by a
member; and (3) in effect, to regulate the commission, discount
or spread chargeable by members.6 Section 22(c) gives like
jurisdiction to the Commission after one year from the effective
date of the Act.
Other provisions of Section 22 limit the suspension by an
investment company of the right of redemption and its right to(
restrict the transferability or negotiability of any of its shares.
Open-end companies are also prohibited from issuing its securi-
ties for services or for property other than cash and securities,
'except as a dividend or distribution to its security holders or in
connection with a reorganization.
CAPITAL STRUCTURE
The question of the capital structure permissible for an in-
vestment company was a highly controversial subject. The more
radical believed not only that no senior securities should be per-
mitted in the future, but that the Act should contain a "death
sentence" for these securities, that is to say, should set a time
limit during which existing senior capital must be liquidated.
Closely allied to the question of senior securities was that of
voting rights, for in many cases investment companies were con-
trolled either completely or for all practical purposes by the
common stock or by a special issue of common stock, even though
the assets of the corporation were insufficient to liquidate its
senior securities. In many instances this distribution of voting
rights-criticized as inequitable-was due to the fact that drastic
76. Proposed rules, drafted by the National Association of Security
Dealers, Inc., prohibit unfair selling commissions; require the calculation
twice daily of net asset value in connection with sales; prohibit members
from withholding the placing of customers' orders for the purpose of them-
selves profiting as the result of such withholding; prohibit members from
purchasing from any open-end company securities of which they are under-
writer except for the purpose of covering purchase orders already received
or from an underwriter other than for investment or to cover purchase
orders already received. As the jurisdiction of the Association is only over
its members the effectiveness of these prohibitions is supplemented by a
provision which in effect prevents members from distributing through or
acting as dealers for non-members.
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shrinkages in market values had, for the present at least, wiped
out all value for the junior stock which by its terms had consti-
tuted a cushion or safeguard for the senior security.77 In other
cases, it is true, control was placed from the start in a small
group of stockholders, either the common stock as a whole, or
a special class of common stock, sometimes having relatively
little investment in the corporation.78 In respect of this voting
situation also, it was the position of the more extreme that dras-
tic remedial legislation and reshuffling of voting rights was
called for.
These matters had been discussed by representatives of the
industry with the Commission in conferences held prior to the
introduction of the original bill, and the Commission had come
to the conclusion that, while it would propose that no senior
securities be permitted to be issued in the future, it would not
suggest a death sentence on those already existing. As to voting
rights, its recommendation was that it be given the power to
compel an equitable redistribution, that is to say, a reshuffling
of voting rights.""
The industry opposed vigorously in the Senate hearings and
in later negotiations with the Commission a prohibition on future
issues of senior securities and the proposal to redistribute voting
rights. While the first presented no immediate practical problem
to the investment companies represented at the hearings, except
in relation to possible refundings or reorganizations, yet the
proposal seemed wrong on principle and perhaps too was re-
garded as an unjustified reflection on existing senior securities.
As to the reshuffling of voting rights, this seemed to the indus-
try an unwarranted interference with contract rights of stock-
holders.80
77. At the time of the organization of a corporation, with substantial
assets behind the common stock, the voting rights of stockholders may have
been fairly distributed in relation to capital contribution. A subsequent
drastic decline in market value, however, may have wiped out the asset
value of the common stock, leaving it with nothing but its voting rights
and a hope for the future.
78. While such a set-up is now quite generally criticized, it must be
remembered that in many cases this form of structure was not only accepted
but welcomed by stockholders as a means of insuring control of the cor-
poration by a trusted group.
79. See sec. 18, S. 3580 (1940) 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. Note that in giving
the Commission authority to force "an equitable redistribution of voting
rights and privileges" no real standards were set.
80. As previously indicated, in many cases the common stockholder by
the terms of the charter, in other words his contract with the preferred
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Ultimately, by agreement with the Commission, the proposal
for redistribution of voting rights was eliminated and future
issues of senior securities were not prohibited, but were regu-
lated. As to closed-end companies, in the future senior securi-
ties could only be issued if at the time of issue they had an asset
coverage of 300 per cent if an indebtedness, and 200 per cent
if a preferred stock. In connection with the future issue of in-
debtedness the Act requires that there be prohibited the declara-
tion of any dividend or the purchase of any capital stock unless
the indebtedness should have an asset coverage of 300 per cent
at the time of such dividend or purchase, with an exception per-
mitting dividends on preferred stock where the coverage on the
indebtedness is at least 200 per cent. It is also required that
provision be made for voting rights to holders of the indebted-
ness where its asset coverage is less than 100 per cent or, in
the alternative, that a default shall have been deemed to have
occurred where the asset coverage shall have been less than 100
per cent for each of twenty-four consecutive months. 81 Future
issues of preferred stock are to be protected by a prohibition
against payment of any dividend upon or purchase of any com-
mon stock unless the preferred stock had an asset coverage of
200 per cent and by the stipulation that they be given certain
voting rights.8 2 It is required that dividends be cumulative and
that any future preferred stock shall have complete priority over
any other class as to distribution of assets and payment of divi-
dends.83 Only one class of funded indebtedness (other than short
term loans) is permitted, and only one class of preferred stock.
Provision is made for refunding of existing senior securities and
for issuance of senior securities on reorganization in amounts
stockholders, placed in jeopardy and actually lost his entire investment for
the protection of the preferred stockholder. This same contract, however,
gave him certain voting privileges and it seemed to him unjust that he
should lose both his asset value as provided for in his contract and his
voting rights in spite of his contract. In this discussion the words "con-
stitutional rights" could be heard but without too much conviction.
81. The reason for the alternative was that it was realized that practical
difficulties under state law might make it impossible to give to the holders
of the indebtedness the voting rights referred to.
82. The right as a class to elect two directors at all times and a majority
in the event of default in dividends equal to two years' dividend require-
ments; also certain voting rights in connection with proposed reorganiza-
tions.
83. Thus participating preferred stocks or stocks preferred as to assets
but not as to dividends, or vice versa, were prohibited.
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comparable to those pre-existing, irrespective of the above pro-
visions. Warrants are prohibited as to the future, except short
term warrants issued exclusively and ratably to a class or classes
of a company's securities.
For the most part existing open-end companies did not have
senior securities, and these are prohibited. Almost all agreed
that it was unsound to have outstanding an issue of bonds or
preferred stock, where the common stock was subject to redemp-
tion at the will of the stockholder, for the equity could thus be
taken away completely from behind the senior security. Provi-
sion is made, however, permitting bank borrowings by open-end
companies provided that a 300 per cent asset coverage is kept
at all times.84
Subsection (i) of Section 18 in effect provides that all common
stock hereafter issued must have equal voting power. In line
with this policy of insuring votes to stockholders, voting trusts
as to the future are prohibited. 5 Existing voting trusts are per-
mitted to run out but may not be renewed.
DIVIDENDS
Dividend restrictions in connection with the future issue of
senior securities have already been discussed. 6 The remaining
provisions as to dividends are simple, at least on .their face.
Any company making a distribution to stockholders other than
(1) out of undistributed net income, not including profits or
losses realized on the sale of securities or other property, or
(2) out of such company's net income so defined for the current
or preceding fiscal year, must accompany the dividend by a
written statement which adequately discloses the source or
sources of such payment.87
This provision of the bill in its final form is based on the
premise that, subject to limitations of state law, the question
of dividend payment is a matter of internal management which
should be left to the discretion of the board of directors of an
84. In the case of bank borrowings it is relatively simple to maintain the
prescribed ratio at all times.
85. Sec. 20(b).
86. See page 334, supra.
87. Sec. 19. The original bill permitted dividends on junior securities,
only if certain prescribed asset ratios were maintained for securities senior
to them. Discretion to vary these ratios within limits was vested in the
Commission.
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investment company, but that stockholders should be properly
advised as to the nature of the distributions which they receive.88
Questions entering into a decision as to whether or not to pay
dividends in a given instance are much too complex and involve
too many factors in which there is room for the reasonable exer-
cise of discretion to permit of rigid statutory standards or pro-
hibitions. For example, whether or not to pay dividends on a
preferred stock in excess of earnings involves consideration of
a number of factors. Where preferred dividends are in effect
paid out of capital funds, if the assets of the company are more
than sufficient to cover the preferred stock, such dividends paid
to the preferred stockholders are in substance distributions made
from the capital of the common stock. If the preferred stock is
insufficiently covered, preferred dividends paid out of capital are
a return to the preferred stockholder of his own capital with
the obligation remaining, of course, to make good the capital
impairment. In both cases it must be assumed that an "artificial"
surplus has been created by stockholders for the express purpose
of permitting the making of these distributions. A factor in
connection with the payment of dividends to preferred stock-
holders, where not earned, may be the nature of the company's
portfolio. For example, the company may have adequate assets
to earn the preferred dividend, if such assets are wholly invested
in income-bearing securities and yet the management may decide,
primarily for the benefit of the common stockholders, to place
a large part of the corporation's capital in non-income bearing
securities in the hope of greater appreciation. Or it may be that
large amounts of cash are held in the expectation of a serious
market decline, thus reducing the income of the company.
Where there is no senior security, the considerations entering
into the payment of dividends are apt to be less complicated.
In the case of open-end companies there is a special situation
which must be borne in mind. These companies in selling securi-
ties at asset value commonly allocate to dividend distribution
88. After extensive conferences with representatives of the National
Committee of Investment Companies and with a committee of accountants,
the staff of the Commission has formulated, and the Commission promul-
gated, rules governing the method of calculating the source of dividend
payments. See Rule N-19-1. The fact that this has been no easy task
emphasizes the undesirability of trying to legislate rigid prohibitions in
respect of dividend payments.
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account that portion of the consideration received which repre-
sents a pro rata share of the accumulated income of the cor-
poration. When the new stockholder receives his first dividend
he will be receiving, in part at least, a return of his purchase
price. If this were not done and his dividend were paid solely
out of true income, existing stockholders would be prejudiced by
the admission of a new stockholder. Similarly, upon redemption
of a share there is charged to the dividend distribution account
that portion of the redemption price which represents the stock-
holder's pro rata share of the income to date. Tax considerations
also play an important part, particularly as to open-end com-
panies. To qualify as a "mutual company," which is virtually
relieved of federal income taxation, an open-end company must
distribute all of its taxable earnings.,9 But such earnings, in-
cluding current profits on sales of securities irrespective of ac-
cumulated deficits, may have little relation to investment com-
pany concepts as to amounts properly distributable.
In considering the dividend problem of investment companies,
it should be remembered that an entirely new concept of earn-
ings appropriate for dividends has developed in recent years.
State laws governing the payment of dividends, as in other cor-
porate matters, do not generally distinguish between investment
companies and industrial companies.,* In respect of corporate
income, for example, the normal concept includes or deducts, as
the case may be, profits or losses from the sale of securities as
well as other assets. If an individual investor owns securities,
he will receive the income from such securities irrespective of
losses which may be realized on switches of investments. He
89. See Revenue Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 447, 552, c. 289 26 U. S. C. A.
sec. 361. The special treatment accorded "mutual investment companies"
dates from 1936. See Revenue Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1648, 1669.
90. In the development of investment company practices in the last two
decades one of the major problems has been the application to investment
companies of concepts of corporate law evolved in respect of industrial
companies. In many instances these did not particularly fit. For example,
the purchase by a corporation of its own stock, a common practice with
investment companies, had but limited precedent under corporate law as
applied to industrial companies. Furthermore, concepts of capital and sur-
plus as related to dividend payments, were based upon assets, largely fixed,
not readily marketable, and not subject to large and sudden fluctuations
in values. As against this, the quoted market values of an investment
company's assets are likely to fluctuate violently in short spaces of time,
so that a large surplus existing at the time of a dividend declaration might
have disappeared by the payment date, only a few weeks later.
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will not be particularly pleased with his holdings in an invest-
ment company if he cannot receive his share of the current in-
come earned on dividends and interest because of capital losses
suffered.91
But there can be no doubt that the stockholder should be prop-
erly advised as to the source of any dividends which he may
receive. The furnishing of such advice has been a practice fairly
generally followed by investment companies in the past, partly
as the result of stock exchange standards, partly as the result
of Blue Sky requirements, and partly as the result of the recog-
nition by the industry itself of its desirability. Were a stock-
holder not properly informed, there might be opportunity for
the unscrupulous unduly to stimulate the price of stock through
heavy distributions by way of dividends not warranted and not
properly explained. This perhaps is largely theoretical in re-
spect of closed-end companies, as the "market" is peculiarly wise.
However, in relation to the distribution of open-end securities
where high pressure sales tactics have at times been used on
unsophisticated persons, large dividend payments, where not
warranted, could be and undoubtedly have been used to stimulate
sales. True, the extent to which the average individual is en-
lightened by the vast amount of information shoved at him by
the various securities acts is problematical. But experience seems
to indicate that the requirement that such information be given
has a salutary effect on corporations and managements, particu-
larly when such information is subject to the scrutiny of a fed-
eral agency.
PROXIES AND PLANS OF REORGANIZATION
The section dealing with proxies is completely at variance
with the general approach of the Act. There is prohibited the
solicitation of proxies in respect of securities of registered in-
vestment companies in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Contrary to the general structure of the Act, this legislation is
91. It is true that during the period of rising prices in the 1920's when
the question was not that of deducting_ losses from current income, but of
adding capital gains to such income, the problem was not particularly ap-
preciated and investment companies, just as individuals, were only too
happy to look upon these profits as real additions to income.
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not detailed and not even general standards are prescribed. The
pattern and text is that of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
giving almost unlimited discretion to the Commission. However,
this section was accepted by the industry because most of the
companies directly represented in the drafting of the Act were
subject to the proxy regulations under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and therefore the question was pretty much aca-
demic.
In respect of plans of reorganization, the Act provides that
all proxy or similar material must be filed with the Commission
for its information within twenty-four hours after the com-
mencement of any solicitation; that the Commission is author-
ized, if so requested by any company which is the subject of
reorganization or by the holders of 25 per cent of any class of
its securities, to render an advisory report as to the fairness of
any such plan; and finally that the Commission is authorized to
bring proceedings in a United States District Court to enjoin
the consummation of any plan of reorganization upon showing
to the satisfaction of the court that any such plan is grossly
unfair or constitutes gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust
on the part of the officers, directors, or investment advisers of
the registered company or other sponsors of the plan. In bring-
ing any such proceeding the authority in the Commission is to
act on behalf of the security holders of the investment company.
Under the original bill no plan of reorganization of an invest-
ment company could be consummated except after proceedings
before the Commission and an order of the Commission permit-
ting such plan to become effective. Such approval was to be with-
held if the Commission found the plan (1) not fair and equitable,
(2) not feasible, or (3) inconsistent with the purposes of the
Act. The foregoing provisions were vigorously protested by the
industry. Its members saw no reason why reorganizations of
investment companies should be on a basis different from reor-
ganizations of industrial companies. Alleged abuses in connec-
tion with reorganizations were no more frequent in cases of
investment companies than other types of companies.
The compromise evidenced by the Investment Company Act
seemed reasonably to meet the views of both Commission and
industry. The provision for filing proxies and other material is
designed to inform the Commission as to plans of reorganiza-
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tions, but contains no grant of power. In respect of proxies so
fied, the Commission derives its power under the proxy section
of the Act. In discussing these provisions, representatives of
the Commission expressed the belief that many companies would
like the benefit of at least an advisory opinion from the Com-
mission and consequently power was granted to render such
opinion on request. It appears that already several companies
have availed themselves of this. The provision permitting 25
-per cent of any class of securities to call upon the Commission
for an advisory opinion is not likely to be of much importance,
as the time element will not generally permit this to function.
Representatives of the industry proposed to the Commission
that, in lieu of power to pass upon all plans of reorganization,
it be given authority in effect to intervene on behalf of stock-
holders by a proceeding in the federal court when it believed
any plan to be grossly unfair. This provision in the opinion of
the writer constitutes an interesting experiment. The arm of
an administrative branch of the government is available to pro-
tect the rights of stockholders in an extreme case, but jurisdic-
tion to determine the issue is vested in a court and not in the
Commission. It must be remembered that under existing laws
it is the courts to whom stockholders must look for protection and
determination of their rights in connection with any reorganiza-
tion. There seemed no reason why this jurisdiction, exercised
for many years by the courts, should be shifted to an adminis-
trative agency. On the other hand, it seemed reasonable that
-the stockholder who might not have sufficient means to cope on
equal terms with a management backed by corporate funds,
should have the assistance of a governmental agency. From a
practical point of view, the writer would expect that the mere
existence of this power in the Commission would have a salutary
effect.
PERIODIC REPORTS, ACCOUNTS, AND RECORDS;
APPOINTMENT OF AUDITORS
Sections 30 and 31 deal with periodic reports, accounts, and
records. Investment companies are required to file the same
reports as are required of listed companies under the Securities
Exchange Act. Copies of reports to stockholders must be filed
-with the Commission. Reports are required to be transmitted to
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stockholders at least semi-annually and must contain such of
the items definitely enumerated in the Act as the Commission
may prescribe . 2 These reports to stockholders may not be mis-
leading in the light of reports filed with the Commission. This
last somewhat curiously worded provision is a compromise giv-
ing to the Commission some jurisdiction over the form of re-
ports to stockholders. As the Commission has fairly broad powers
as to the form of reports filed with it, the necessity of having
the reports to stockholders be at least reconcilable with- the
former accomplishes this.93 It is further provided that financial
statements contained both in reports filed with the Commission
and in those transmitted to stockholders, if so required by the
Commission, be accompanied by a certificate of independent pub-
lic accountants. The scope of the audit of the independent ac-
countant is prescribed in somewhat general terms and in particu-
lar there are specified the methods for verifying securities owned.
Certain accounts and records are required to be maintained for
such period as the Commission may prescribe and are to be sub-
ject to examination by the Commission. The Commission is also
given authority to issue rules and regulations providing for a
reasonable degree of uniformity in the accounting policies and
principles to be followed by investment companies. More drastic
provisions in the original bill, giving the Commission broad pow-
ers over accounts and records and reports to stockholders, were
eliminated.
The foregoing provisions of the Act are, in the opinion of the
writer, of fundamental importance. The requirements for ex-
tensive disclosure in reports to the Commission and to stock-
holders, -"1 together with the provisions making accounts and rec-
ords of investment companies open to inspection by the Com-
92. The enumerated items are (1) a balance sheet; (2) a list of amounts
and values of securities; (3) an income statement, itemized at least as to
matters representing more than 5 per cent of total income or expenses;
(4) a surplus statement, itemized at least in respect of matters representing
more than 5 per cent of total charges or credits; (5) a statement of pay-
ments in certain specified categories to officers, directors, and affiliated
persons; and (6) a statement of the aggregate dollar amounts of purchases
and sales of securities.
93. Under the Securities Exchange Act the Commission, while prescrib-
ing the form of reports filed with it, has no jurisdiction over reports sent
to stockholders.
94. Naturally, the requirements as to reporting to the Commission are
much more far reaching than would be feasible in stockholders' reports.
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mission, are very effective restraints on improper action. The
prophylactic effect of publicity requirements is too generally
recognized to need discussion here. Suffice it to say that even
transactions honestly believed to have been entered into in good
faith often look quite different in the broad glare of public
scrutiny.
Section 32 of the Act in effect requires investment companies
to appoint annually independent public accountants in the fol-
lowing manner: (1) such accountants are to be selected in the
first instance by a majority of those members of the board of
directors who are not officers or employees or investment ad-
visers of such registered company; (2) such selection must be
submitted for ratification or rejection at the next annual meet-
ing of stockholders; and (3) the employment of such accountants
must be conditioned upon the right of the company by vote of a
majority of outstanding voting securities at any meeting called
for such purpose to terminate the employment forthwith. If the
selection of the directors is rejected, the stockholders may ap-
point auditors. It is further provided that the certificate or
report of accountants shall be addressed both to the board of
directors and to the security holders of the investment com-
pany.95 All this is accomplished by provision that after one year
from the effective date of the Act it shall be unlawful for any
registered management company to file with the Commission
any financial statement signed or certified by an independent
public accountant unless such accountant has been appointed in
the manner above indicated.96
The evident purpose of these provisions is to insure that audi-
tors are responsible to the security holders of the company as
well as to the directorsY7 They represent a compromise between
the views of the Commission, as expressed in the original bill.
and elsewhere, that auditors should be selected by stockholders,
and the views of the industry that responsibility for audits lies
with the board of directors under corporate law and that there-
95. Special provision is made with respect to common law trusts.
96. In similar manner it is provided that the comptroller or other prin-
cipal accounting officer or employee of every management company must
be elected, either by the holders of such company's voting securities or by
the board of directors of the company.
97. Similarly, the purpose of the provision with respect to the comp-
troller or chief accounting officer is to make such person responsible to
the directors rather than to some senior executive officer.
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fore the auditors should be selected by them. It was of course
not disputed that public accountants, no matter who selected
them, had a responsibility to security holders and others as well
as to the board of directors. Judge Healy, the member of the
Commission in charge of the investment company investigation
and the proposals for legislation, in his testimony before the
Senate Committee stated his view that the practical effect of
having auditors selected by stockholders was primarily one of
emphasis and psychology. 8 It would seem that this objective is
met by the provisions of the bill as enacted. Nevertheless, the
Commission in its general attitude towards the selection of ac-
countants still seems to hold to its original position that such
selection should be made by stockholders.
FUNCTIONS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
UNDER THE ACT
General powers of enforcement are given to the Securities and
Exchange Commission more or less in line with powers held by
it under other acts.99 In some respects the enforcement powers
contained in the original bill have been modified. Broadly speak-
ing, however, the same powers of enforcement that originally
seemed so alarming to the industry became unobjectionable when
contained in the final bill with its modified substantive provi-
sions. Of particular importance as an enforcement weapon are
the provisions permitting the Commission to make such investi-
gations as it may deem necessary to determine whether any per-
son has violated or is about to violate any provision of the Act
and permitting the Commission specifically to bring proceedings
in the United States courts to enjoin any violation which may
be threatened.
The Commission is authorized to bring proceedings in the
United States courts alleging that any officer, director, member
of an advisory board, investment adviser, depositor, or principal
underwriter has been guilty of gross misconduct or gross abuse
of trust in respect of a registered investment company, and upon
98. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking
and Currency on S. 3580 (1940) 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 305. Whatever the
form, experience indicates that in normal cases it is to be expected that
stockholders will vote in favor of the selection of such auditors as may be
recommended by the management.
99. Sec. 42.
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the establishment of such allegations the court is directed to
enjoin any such person from acting in such capacity either per-
manently or for such period of time as it in its discretion shall
deem appropriate.10 This provision grew out of one in the
original bill which made any gross misconduct or gross abuse
of trust unlawful. The industry objected to it on the ground
that such an indefinite standard should not be made the basis of
a federal offense.
Other powers vested in the Commission, including the broad
discretion to grant exemptions from specific prohibitions, have
been referred to from time to time in the discussion of specific
sections of the Act. In general, as has been seen, the Act pro-
hibits with definiteness many types of transactions, giving to
the Commission power to grant exceptions. These exceptions in
almost all, if not all, cases may be either by general rule or regu-
lations or upon order in specific cases. The most important and
far reaching of these grants of power is that of Section 6 (c)
which permits the Commission conditionally or unconditionally
to exempt any person, security, or transaction or any class or
classes thereof, from any of the provisions of the Act. Without
these exemptive powers and without a wise exercise of discre-
tion thereunder, the Act would be unworkable, unduly restric-
tive, and would cause unnecessary hardships.
In the granting of such wide discretion, particularly in indi-
vidual cases, it must be recognized that there is always the
theoretical possibility of grave abuse of power by an unscrupu-
lous agency through special treatment to favored persons. But
this possibility was not even seriously considered by the industry.
Respect for the integrity of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission as well as for most federal agencies is such that this
particular evil is not a present threat. On the other hand, the
industry did object to the broad delegations of the original bill
under which matters of fundamental importance were left for
formulation to the Commission, with little if any standards for
guidance. It is true, as Judge Healy stated in his testimony
before the Senate Committee,"' that Congress alone can legislate
and the Commission can merely issue rules and regulations. But
100. See. 36.
101. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking
and Currency on S. 3580 (1940) 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 45.
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it is small comfort to an individual that it is not legislation but
only a rule or regulation that stands between him and a desired
objective. The penalty for violation makes no distinction.
Viewed as a whole, it is the belief of the writer that the Com-
mission has very extensive control over the investment company
industry. Aside from the exercise of specific powers, the mere
existence of such gives to the Commission a wide authority.
Wisely and judiciously exercised, this influence of the Commis-
sion can be of great benefit to investment companies and their
stockholders. It can be a factor of prime importance in molding
the development of investment company practice. The experi-
ence of the few months in which the Act has been in operation
already gives ample proof of this. It is becoming widespread
practice to consult with the Commission as to matters over which
it has no specific jurisdiction.
On the other hand it must not be overlooked that in any in-
stance where an agency has such broad powers, its authority
can be used improperly to force compliance in matters not with-
in its jurisdiction. This possibility, always more likely on the
part of subordinates, calls for constant vigilance on the part of
the agency lest it more or less unconsciously drift into this very
grave abuse. Furthermore there exists at times a temptation,
in granting exemptions, to impose restrictions deemed wise by
the agency but not warranted by the terms of the Act.
Fortunately cooperation under the Investment Company Act
between the Commission and the industry is continuing. This
is carried on primarily through the National Committee of In-
vestment Companies, an informal association open to all mem-
bers of the industry and containing as members a very substan-
tial portion of existing investment companies. This Committee,
through its executive director 12 and counsel, is in constant touch
with the staff of the Commission and is consulted by it on all
matters of general interest to the industry. Rules and regula-
tions are developed in conferences between the two groups and
where questions arising in connection with specific cases appear
to be of general interest, these matters are also generally dis-
cussed with representatives of the Committee. In connection
102. Mr. Paul Bartholet, the Executive Director, for many years an in-
vestment company officer, acted as technical adviser to the representatives
of the industry in connection with the drafting of the Act.
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with matters relating to the distribution of securities of open-
end companies, cooperation with the Commission is largely
through the National Association of Security Dealers, Inc.10 3
CONCLUSION
There has been complaint on the part of some that the Act
is unnecessarily long and complex. That it is long and complex
is admitted, but whether unnecessarily so is another matter. It
is true that the necessity for haste in its drafting is responsible
for some imperfections and that with more time available faulty
draftsmanship in certain instances would undoubtedly have been
eliminated.e But in the main it is due to the fundamental theory
on which the Act was drafted, namely, that prohibited acts be
specifically enumerated subject to exceptions in the discretion
of the Commission.
It would have been comparatively easy to draft a short act
containing on the one hand very drastic and sweeping prohibi-
tions and, on the other hand, setting up standards of practice in
very general terms to be worked out case by case either by the
Commission or the courts. For example, complete segregation
from investment companies of investment bankers, dealers in
securities, brokers, investment advisers, bank officers, and direc-
tors and directors of portfolio companies could have been effected
in simple language. But the industry would have opposed this
vigorously and the Commission had concluded that such segre-
gation was not warranted. It therefore became necessary to
formulate rather elaborate and perhaps complicated provisions
to curtail, if not eliminate, the possibility of abuses which might
arise from improper use of these relationships. Had the Act in
general terms prohibited "unfair practices" and such, the draft-
ing might have been simple and a great deal of ink saved, but
the industry would have been left in complete uncertainty as
to its rights and duties. Past experience has shown that this type
of legislation is not workable as a means of regulating industry.15
It was not intended that the Act should be a complete cure of
103. See page 331, supra.
104. The Act was written in substantially its present form between May
13 and May 31, 1940. It was expected at the time that Congress would
adjourn in the middle or end of June.
105. Cf. Sherman Act (1890) 26 Stat. 209, c. 647, 15 U. S. C. A. secs.
1-7.
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all possible evils in the investment company field. It seemed wiser
to proceed cautiously and experimentally, attempting to prevent
the main abuses which had been known to exist. In the light
of experience, some amendments will undoubtedly be necessary.
But in general it is the belief of the writer that the Act in its
present form, because of specific prohibitions, because of its pro-
phylactic effect, because of the intangible influence which the
Commission is able to exercise, and because of the continuing
cooperation between the Commission and the industry, will prove
a satisfactory piece of legislation. Beyond that, it is the hope of
many that if further regulation of business by the federal gov-
ernment becomes necessary, this example of mutual trust and
cooperation between government and industry may set a useful
precedent.
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